Introduction
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 , the American constitutional system was shaken by a series of controversies arising out of the aggressive response of the Bush administration. Prominent among these were furious and deeply felt disputes over the use of torture in interrogation, the treatment of detainees, especially at Guantanamo Bay, and domestic surveillance. The Bush administration came under heavy criticism not only for actions initially taken in secret and unauthorized by Congress, but for the way it led the nation into the authorized war against Iraq in 2003. Many Americans believed that the war had been foisted on the public in a deceptive way without adequate consideration of its costs. As a result of these controversies, President George W. Bush was only the latest in a long line of chief executives accused of acting as an "imperial" president.
The advent of the Obama administration did not lead to a stilling of the waters. To an extent surprising to his supporters, President Barack Obama did not break decisively with all of the controversial policies of the Bush administration.
2 This suggested a factor common to these administrations was at work. The controversies that plagued the Bush administration and the unwillingness of the Obama administration to change those policies were the latest examples of a long chain of constitutional difficulties connected with the unilateral exercise of presidential power in foreign affairs and, more specifically, the use of presidential power to wage war.
Controversies over the use of executive power have existed throughout American history.
But they took on a completely new dimension following the enormous expansion in the capacities of government necessary to prevail in World War II and the Cold War. Seen in this light, the deeply problematic aspects of the Bush administration's "war on terror" belong to a family of constitutional crises that include Watergate in the Nixon administration and the Irancontra affair in the Reagan administration. These crises are part of a pattern of recurrent policy disasters and constitutional problems linked to the war power that run back to the Truman administration and include both covert and overt military operations such as the Bay of Pigs and the Vietnam War.
Scholars have had difficulty analyzing this recurrent pattern, in part because of the influence of persuasive, yet misleading narratives such as the "imperial presidency." While presidents have not been blameless in their exercise of power in foreign affairs, neither have they been alone in making decisions or operating entirely outside the Constitution. Criticizing presidents as individuals gone haywire ignores that they have had significant, even sometimes overwhelming, political support for actions that from a constitutional point of view are quite dubious. It further ignores that they have plausibly seen themselves as chiefly responsible for advancing the foreign policy and protecting the national security of the United States.
3
Americans like to think of their constitutional system as stable and resistant to formal change through amendment. Somewhat paradoxically, they also believe in the "living Constitution," a document that has adapted successfully to changing circumstances. The clashing character of these beliefs has been especially evident in the debate over the use of executive power in foreign affairs. "Presidentialists" argue that increased executive power after
World War II was a reasonable alteration of the constitutional system in light of the new global responsibilities and hegemonic status of the U.S. "Congressionalist" opponents of this perspective cite the original eighteenth-century constitutional arrangements as their touchstone in defending the traditional powers of Congress. Common to both positions is the assumption that regardless of the degree of practical changes in the responsibilities of government, the Constitution was adequate to the challenge of the post-World War II era.
We can make better progress if we reject this assumption. This is an unfamiliar path for analysis, but one better able to cope with the complex relationship between the reality of changed circumstances and a relatively fixed text and set of traditions. Since the United States assumed a position of global leadership and responsibility after World War II, serious tensions have plagued our constitutional system. They are connected by the near-total reliance on executive power to defend national security.
Relative to the popular yet opposed narratives of the imperial presidency and executive triumphalism offered by congressionalists and presidentialists respectively, the argument I develop in this book is complex and cuts across the standard lines of the war powers debate.
With presidentialists, I agree that the new global responsibilities of the United States necessitated a significant alteration to the constitutional order. Against presidentialists, I contend that the transition was anything but a smooth adaptation and was the source of severe and ongoing authorities that all parties acknowledge as relevant to the war powers controversy, but by the actual practice of American diplomacy. While historical practice is a source of evidence that presidentialists have claimed for their own, it in fact supports the vital qualification that among the tools of diplomacy and national security strategy, war is special. The original constitutional order, preserved in key respects through the decades until the advent of the Cold War, makes approval by Congress obligatory before the nation goes to war. This order encouraged interbranch deliberation by requiring presidents to run the risk that their proposals for war would be rejected. In the post-1945 period, the unthinking extension of the position that the executive must lead in foreign affairs to the very different situation presented by decisions for war has destabilized the constitutional system and deranged policymaking.
In understanding the differences between the Cold War and previous periods of military conflict, we must consider all three dimensions of executive war making that were prominent after 1945. The Cold War featured new ways of war making in addition to conventional war.
For example, covert wars involved paramilitary forces recruited from other countries. These forces were capable of mounting significant military operations, whether considered technically "covert" or not. Likewise, we should not overlook nuclear weapons. The presence of such destructive weapons strongly influenced military doctrine for fighting conventional wars.
Perhaps more important, all presidents in the post-World War II period were required to come to grips with their responsibility for ordering U.S. forces to launch a strike that might kill hundreds of millions of people and render large areas of the globe uninhabitable.
One main theme of this book is that the Constitution can influence policy even when it is not enforced by the courts. War powers are an especially timely and relevant example of this phenomenon, which is still too little acknowledged by lawyers and legal academics. The Constitution could not constrain or empower government until it was implemented within an institutional structure which I call a "constitutional order." A succession of constitutional orders has enabled government to function effectively in the United States from the eighteenth century onward. War powers, however, have had a unique history. The Constitution was written to reflect the premise that the nation could go to war only through the meaningful deliberation and consent of the legislative and executive branches of government. A war undertaken solely by one branch would thus risk policy catastrophe. This is what has occurred all too frequently since 1945.
Critics of the imperial presidency have worried about the loss of civil liberties that has followed from the expansion of presidential power. Although I do not wish to minimize the violations of constitutional rights that did occur in the Cold War and after, our chief concern should be the consequences of overthrowing the policymaking process for war established by the was certainly engaged in world affairs as a naval power, it also adhered to a sharp distinction between war and peace and declarations or authorizations of war as integral elements of diplomacy. The Cold War constitutional order involved apprehension of an existential threat, a perceived danger from an appealing global ideology that mandated increased internal security, assertions that we had to stand ready to violate long-held values and beliefs, and enforced acceptance that we were in totally unique circumstances, never before seen in American history, involving an indefinite war against an implacable foreign enemy. If these elements seem familiar, as of course they should, I hope you will join me in wondering why scholars have not been probing the Cold War more assiduously for clues about the sources of our post-9/11 difficulties in foreign policy. 6 While war powers are central to my argument, this book is more of an analytical history of presidential decisionmaking than a legal treatise and, apart from parts of chapters 1 and 2, is not structured as a contribution to the war powers debate. In turn, because of this misunderstanding, the clarity with which the evidence from the founding period speaks to the contemporary war powers debate has not been appreciated fully. Beginning with Truman, nearly all post-1945 presidents have claimed the unilateral power under Article II to initiate war, "real" war, full-scale war. The underappreciated crux of the war powers debate is that while this bold presidential claim is inconsistent with the historical meaning of the Constitution, it has an eminently defensible policy rationale.
While I am not sympathetic to this unilateral presidential claim, the standard congressionalist critique is simply too narrow. Considered from the perspective of the executive branch, this claim does not appear extraordinary because it is encapsulated in a larger perspective, which many have found persuasive, in which military force is one tool among others in advancing the foreign policy and preserving the national security of the United States. By concentrating on whether every presidential military action is specifically authorized, the congressionalist critique has missed the real problem -the absence of interbranch deliberation over time on matters of foreign policy and national security strategy -that is, the lack of a cycle of accountability.
By contending that presidential war powers claims should be understood within the framework of American diplomacy, I urge a bit more sympathy for presidents than congressionalists have managed to display in the war powers debate. The presidentialist position cannot be understood and evaluated appropriately unless we have a firm grasp on the situation the executive branch faced at the beginning of the Cold War.
In order to carry out this contextual task, we must expand the frame of the war powers debate, considering insights that constitutional scholars have generally bypassed from primary and secondary sources relating to diplomatic history and presidential decision making in foreign policy. This book is thus based primarily on a comprehensive survey of the diplomatic and In all candor I should say that proposing solutions is secondary to this book's purpose.
Why is this justifiable? While I like proposing solutions as much as the next legal academic, it bears emphasis that the solutions offered in faculty lounges tend to assume a judicial deus ex machina that is not available for war powers. The most important task with respect to war powers is simply to understand the position we are in. Thus my primary purpose is not to propose solutions to our war powers difficulties but rather to change our perspective on both where the problem lies and how to move forward.
Ultimately, I aim to provide the missing connections between the exercise of presidential power in foreign affairs and a continuing series of policy disasters and constitutional crises. This book connects the dots with respect to the Constitution and national security and explains a recurrent and, indeed, tragic pattern of interbranch relations and presidential decisions.
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